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The Fed’s Backroom Bailout Policy:   
Reportedly more than $2 trillion in loans and guarantees without 
a timely public record, expanding its regulatory powers 
despite a history of malfeasance and, since October 2008, 
rewarding banks for holding their surging reserves rather 
than lending. 
Robert D. Auerbach* 
Since the Federal Reserve (the Fed) started its loan policies 
in 2007, it has loaned and guaranteed perhaps $2 trillion or 
more.1  That estimate does not count the 96 percent increase in 
the monetary base of the money supply in the four months since 
October 2008 which the Fed has created; an increase of $795 
billion.2  At this rate the base of the money supply was closing in 
on $1 trillion.3  A huge surge in the monetary base is necessary to 
keep the Fed’s target short term interest rate near zero. 
Where is all that money?  Most is being held by the nation’s 
banks.4  Since October 2008, the Fed has paid interest to the 
banks if they held the money.5  As I will explain, that policy 
intensifies the financial crisis. 
Complete timely records of the Fed’s bailout actions and 
deliberations, if they exist, would establish responsibility for its 
unelected officials.  Bloomberg news was turned down by the Fed 
 
* Professor of Public Affairs, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University 
of Texas, Austin. 
1 Mark Pittman et al., Fed Defies Transparency Aim in Refusal to Disclose 
(update2), BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 10, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
newsarchive&sid=aOngFPgq7r3M. The monetary base calculated by the St Louis Federal 
Reserve would expand to over $1.7 trillion by May 29, 2009. 
http://research.stlouisfed.com/fred2/data/WSBASE.txt. 
2 FED. RESERVE. AGGREGATE RESERVES OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS AND THE 
MONETARY BASE (2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h3/ 
current/h3.pdf.  
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions, 73 Fed. Reg. 59,482 (Oct. 9, 
2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 204).  See also Press Release, Federal Reserve Board 
(Oct. 6, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081006a.htm 
(announcing that the Fed “will begin to pay interest on depository institutions’ required 
and excess reserve balances.”). 
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in its Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for details and 
has taken the matter to court.6 
Evidently, the Fed intends to continue its record of blocking 
transparency as it did for seventeen years when it denied 
possessing transcripts of its monetary policy committee 
meetings.7  Nevertheless, they were forced to show them during a 
Congressional investigation.8  They were around the corner from 
Alan Greenspan’s office.  Beginning in 1994, the Greenspan Fed 
began to destroy the source records of those transcripts, which 
had been sent to the National Archives.9 
The Fed is the major regulator of the nation’s financial firms 
with regulatory jurisdiction over financial holding companies—
that includes the large trillion dollar banks—and foreign banks.10  
It is now assuming, and Congress is suggesting, legislation for 
more Fed regulatory power,11 even though the Fed’s regulatory 
function is fundamentally flawed and remains a catalyst for more 
crises.12 
The primary conflict of interest at the Fed is its outdated 
organization that gives bankers inside the Fed bureaucracy 
substantial authority to regulate the banks.13  The banks in each 
of their district elect six of the nine members of the boards of 
directors at each of the twelve Federal Reserve district banks.14 
 
 6 Mark Pittman and Bob Ivry, U.S. Taxpayers Risk $9.7 Trillion on Bailout 
Programs (Update1), BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 9, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=washingtonstory&sid=aGq2B3XeGKok (“Bloomberg requested details of Fed 
lending under the Freedom of Information Act and filed a federal lawsuit against the 
central bank Nov. 7 seeking to force disclosure of borrower banks and their collateral.”). 
 7 See ROBERT D. AUERBACH, DECEPTION AND ABUSE AT THE FED; HENRY B. 
GONZALEZ BATTLES ALAN GREENSPAN’S BANK 87 (2008). 
 8 Id. at 108. 
 9 Id. at 103. 
 10 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, 1–4 (1994). 
 11 THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY STRUCTURE 9 (Mar. 2008) (suggesting “[t]he Federal Reserve should have 
primary oversight responsibilities for such payment and settlement systems, should have 
discretion to designate a payment and settlement system as systemically important, and 
should have a full range of authority to establish regulatory standards.”). 
 12 Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Statements of Chairman Cox on IG 
Reports Regarding CSE Program (Sept. 26, 2008) (transcript available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-231.htm). 
 13 The Federal Reserve Board, The Structure of the Federal Reserve System, Board of 
Directors, Selection and Representation, http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/frseries/ 
frseri4.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2009) (characterizing Class A directors of the board of 
directors as typically being bankers).  
 14 Id. (describing the Federal Reserve Banks’ board of directors as divided into three 
classes, where two classes—six of the nine total members—are elected by member banks 
in their district). 
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When J. P. Morgan bought Bear Stearns in 2008, its CEO, 
Jamie Dimon, was also on the board of directors of the bank 
regulator, The New York Federal Reserve Bank.15  Sanford Weil, 
the CEO of Citigroup, was elected to the same board in 2001 and 
his bank was later investigated by Attorney General Eliot Spitzer 
regarding the Citigroup-WorldCom scandal.16 
A false argument can be advanced: “Who better knows how 
to regulate the banks than the banks being regulated?”  I could 
fill a book with the answers from the eleven years I assisted the 
Chairmen, Ranking Members of the House of Representatives 
Committee on Financial Services who carried out investigations 
during the tenure of four Federal Reserve Chairmen: Arthur 
Burns, William Miller, Paul Volcker, and Alan Greenspan.17 
During the 1990s I assisted Chairman/Ranking Member 
Henry B. Gonzalez with his Congressional investigations of the 
Alan Greenspan Federal Reserve.18  As I promised Henry B., as 
they called Gonzalez in his district, I did write a book about those 
investigations that was recently published.19 
It is especially appropriate at Chapman University School of 
Law to mention material included in my book by or about my 
dissertation chairman and friend for many years, Milton 
Friedman.20  In Chapter 9, “When Five Hundred Economists Are 
Not Enough,” Milton is quoted from a Reuters’ 1993 interview on 
the results of an astounding Congressional investigation in which 
I assisted: 
The Fed’s relatively enhanced standing among the public has been 
aided ‘by the fact that the Fed has always paid a great deal of 
attention to soothing the people in the media and buying up its most 
likely critics.’  Recognizing that the Fed employs ‘probably half of the 
monetary economists in the U.S. and has visiting appointments for 
two-thirds of the rest,’ he [Friedman] saw few among the academic 
community who were prepared to criticize the Fed policy.21 
 
 15 Biography of Jamie Dimon, Federal Reserve Bank of New York,  
http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/orgchart/board/dimon.html (last visited Feb. 26, 
2009). 
 16 Press Release, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Sandford Weill Elected to NY 
Fed Board of Directors (Jan. 10, 2001), http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/ 
news_archive/aboutthefed/2001/oa010110.html; See Elizabeth Douglass, N.Y. Widens 
Salomon Investigation, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2002, at C1. 
 17 See AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 106–147. 
 18 Id. 
 19 See generally id. 
 20 Jerry Hicks et al., Orange County Newswatch;; Teacher’s Pet, L.A. TIMES; ORANGE 
COUNTY EDITION, April 21, 1992, at A1 (noting that Chapman University President 
James L. Doti studied economics under Milton Friedman at the University of Chicago). 
 21 AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 142–43. 
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Unfortunately, Milton died in 2006 and could not read the 
finished manuscript.22 
The devastating 1906 earthquake in San Francisco played a 
role in the creation of the Federal Reserve.23  The terrible 
calamity shocked financial markets.24  Still staggering in 1907, 
the nation’s financial system was hammered when the Bank of 
England raised its rates causing an outflow of gold from the 
United States.25  These events led to runs for deposits in private 
sector banks that were caught short.26  The U.S. Treasury, which 
was also short of money due to expenditures on the Panama 
Canal, could not come to the rescue.27  Remedies for the panic 
and banking collapse were worked out in a backroom deal with 
New York bankers who were locked in an all-night session under 
the piercing eyes of a Wall Street power broker, John Pierpont 
Morgan.28 
Does this remind you of the following Federal Reserve 
negotiations in 1998? 
Working from the offices of the New York Fed Bank [in 1998], the Fed 
orchestrated a bailout of LTCM [Long-Term Capital Management] by 
private-sector banks. . . . Greenspan could not or would not tell 
Congress the details of the bailout, apparently because the nation’s 
central bank produced no detailed public records of its actions.  
Hundreds of lawyers and many large financial firms were evidently 
involved in this operation.  These actions put the Greenspan Fed in 
the same league as the tycoons of an earlier age, such as John 
Pierpont Morgan (1837-1913), whose enormous financial deals, which 
had widespread economic effects, were made out of sight of the public 
or its elected officials.29 
The end of a federal government without a central bank 
came after Congress created the Federal Reserve in 1913.30  The 
Fed has come a long way since 1913.  Congress reorganized it in 
1935, with its main power centered at the Washington D.C. 
 
 22 Jonathan Peterson, Milton Friedman: 1912–2006; Economist changed the world, 
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2006, at A1. 
 23 Kerry A. Odell & Marc D. Weidenmier, Real Shock, Monetary Aftershock: The 
1906 San Francisco Earthquake and the Panic of 1907, 64 J. ECON. HIST. 1002, 1003–04, 
(2004). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 A.P. Andrew, The Treasury and the Banks Under Secretary Shaw, 21 Q.J. ECON. 
519, 542 (1907). 
 28 Ellis W. Tallman & Jon R. Moen, Private Sector Responses to the Panic of 1907: A 
comparison of New York and Chicago, ECON. REV., March/April 1995, at 5–8.  
 29 AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 177. 
 30 The History of the Federal Reserve: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/About_Us/who_we_are/about_the_system/history.cfm (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2009). 
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headquarters31 in two committees: the seven-member Board of 
Governors, all of whom are nominated by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate, and the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC).32  The FOMC is composed of the Board of 
Governors and five of the twelve Federal district bank 
presidents, each of whom receives his/her appointment from the 
district Federal Reserve bank’s boards of directors, subject to 
approval by the Board of Governors, without having to be 
publicly questioned, and have their credentials and background 
examined during a Senate confirmation process.33 
The next power increase came in 1951.34  The U.S. Treasury 
Department lost its authority to issue money in an agreement 
during the Truman Administration to end the practice of pegging 
interest rates at low levels in order to support the price of 
government bonds purchased by banks in an effort to help 
finance the government in World War II.35  Its responsibilities for 
issuing currency and coin dwindled to running the Bureau of 
Printing and Engraving that prints money ordered and issued by 
the Federal Reserve.36 
It is a pity that so many people in Congress think they can 
appropriate money, when all they can do is vote for spending bills 
that, when signed by the President, go to the Treasury which 
must then sell securities to obtain borrowed funds.  Only the 
Federal Reserve can order the printing presses to finance the 
spending bills with new money. 
Severe regulatory problems were uncovered during the 
tenure of Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan (1987–2006).  A 
Gonzalez-led congressional investigation received information, 
partially confirmed by the president of the New York Fed, that 
Federal Reserve officers were taking gifts and socializing with 
the bankers they were examining.37  Greenspan even approved of 
the right of Fed bank examiners to give their resumes for 
employment to the banks they were examining.38 
 
 31 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/About_Us/who_we_are/about_the_system/governors.cfm (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2009) (noting that “[t]he Board of Governors in Washington, DC,[sic] 
provides general oversight of the Reserve Banks.”).  
 32 Melcher v. Fed. Open Market Comm., 644 F. Supp. 510, 518 (1986). 
 33 See id. 
 34 DONALD R. WELLS, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: A HISTORY 93–94 (2004); see 
also AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 5. 
 35 WELLS, supra note 34, at 94. 
 36 Bureau of Engraving and Printing-About the BEP, http://www.moneyfactory.gov/ 
section.cfm/2 (last visited Mar. 25, 2009). 
 37 AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 61. 
 38 Id. at 63–64. 
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The 1999 Financial Modernization Bill (Gramm-Leach Bliley 
Act) further destroyed bank examination of the trillion dollar 
banks.39  The 1999 bill repealed the provisions in the banking 
laws of 1932 and 1933 (the Glass-Steagall acts) that separated 
banks from underwriting and other investment bank activities.  
Banks could now be combined with other financial businesses 
with the approval of the Federal Reserve.  Academics who 
misunderstood turf wars praised the functional examination of 
financial conglomerates being spread to many different entities, 
including state insurance regulators.40  The barrier between 
deposits—much of which are a liability of the taxpayers—and 
other activities in these conglomerates is now protected by little 
more than the fictional potted plant between their desks.41 
In 1998, Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin warned the 
Senate Banking Committee about some serious concerns if the 
Modernization Law—which would create superbanks—was 
passed.42  He said, “these large aggregations could present 
competitive problems in the initial stages, and then 
subsequently, if small banks are not able to compete, then you 
can have other kinds of pricing mechanisms develop once they’re 
gone.”43  The bill to create superbanks was required to keep 
together the large financial conglomerate Citigroup, an 
institution built by its former CEO Sanford Weill.44  Citigroup 
hired Rubin a month before the bill became law.45 
During the recent bailout, the locus of policy has shifted from 
the FOMC to the Board of Governors.46  The Board has the 
immense power to bypass the congressional appropriation 
process to make loans to individuals, partnerships and 
corporations that are “unable to secure adequate credit 
accommodations from other banking institutions” provided there 
are “unusual and exigent circumstances” and, before 2002, 
provided at least five of the seven Fed governors authorized the 
 
 39 Id. at 162. 
 40 See id. at 163. 
 41 See id. at 186 (noting that, under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, bank operations 
that sold insurance would only be regulated by state agencies). 
 42 Competition In The Finance Services Industry: Hearing on H.R. 10 Before the S. 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Comm., 105th Cong. 30 (1998) (statement of Robert 
Rubin, Treasury Secretary of the United States). 
 43 Id. 
 44 #242 [of the 400 Richest Americans] – Sanford Weill, FORBES.COM, Sept. 21, 2006, 
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2006/54/biz_06rich400_Sanford-Weill_HRFZ.html.  
 45 Ken Brown & David Enrich, Rubin Defends His Role at Citi, WSJ.COM, Nov. 29, 
2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122791795940965645.html#. 
 46 Patrick McGee, FOMC  Preview: Fed Expected to Maintain Aggressive Policy 
Stance, FOREXTV.COM, Jan. 28, 2009, http://www.forextv.com/Forex/News/ 
ShowStory.jsp?seq=220568&category=Us+Economic+News,FED. 
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action.47  In 2001, the law was amended after the 9/11/01 
terrorist attacks so that, if there are less than five governors in 
office, this loaning power could be authorized by a “unanimous 
vote of all available members then in office—if at least 2 
members are available.”48  Few may argue about the meaning of 
“available” in an explosive financial crisis; for other occasions it 
may not be clear. 
Under the authority of its Board of Governors, the Fed 
stopped a run on an investment bank.49  Reportedly, Chairman 
Ben Bernanke received an early morning crisis request from New 
York Fed Bank President, Timothy Geithner.50  Bernanke “did a 
head count” authorizing J.P. Morgan Chase to 
bailout/takeover/rescue (depending on where you sit) Bear 
Stearns.51 
The Fed’s accounting rules for Bear Stearns’ assets of mainly 
“mortgage backed securities and other mortgage-related assets,” 
which “Bear Stearns valued at $30 billion on March 14,” are 
suspect.52  Morgan will “absorb the first $1 billion of any losses” 
and the “Fed is on the hook for the rest.”53 
What about the market value now?  Testifying in his role as 
President of the New York Fed Bank, Geithner informed the 
Senate Banking Committee that he would report quarterly on 
the “fair value.”54  The members of the Senate and House 
Banking and Financial Services Committees should be 
continually updated on the estimated value and the complete 
details of the method of estimation.  This information should not 
be kept secret from the taxpayers. 
The Fed then expanded its loan faculties to investment 
banks;55 a move that may have saved Bear Stearns had the Fed 
 
 47 See 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006). 
 48 See 12 U.S.C. § 248(r)(2)(A) (2006). 
 49 See Greg Ip, Crisis management: Fed’s Fireman on Wall Street Feels Some Heat; 
Debate Over Bear Stearns Rescue Puts Geithner in Spotlight;; Bernanke’s War Room, WALL 
ST. J. (Eastern Addition), May 30, 2008, at A1. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Jonathan Weil, Fed’s Bear Stearns books Look Prime for Cooking, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, June 18, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
20601039&sid=a70JZmfcakF0&refer=home#. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: Examining the Recent Actions of the Federal 
Financial Regulators Before the S. Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Comm., 110th 
Cong. 57 (2008) (statement of Timothy Geithner, President, Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York). 
 55 See Edmund L. Andrews, Fed Loosens Standards on Emergency Loans, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/ 
business/15fed.html. 
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taken action several weeks earlier.  They could have saved 
Lehman Brothers had they used Section 13-3 of the Federal 
Reserve Act or they could have made it a bank holding company 
with access to the Federal Reserve’s loan window as they did in 
the same month for Goldman Sacks and Morgan Stanley.56  But, 
very mysteriously, several officials in the backroom of the New 
York Federal Reserve claimed they lacked the power at that time 
to bailout Lehman Brothers.57 
Like the promised quarterly reports,58 Congressional 
banking and financial services committees should also receive a 
complete transcript of the Board of Governors’ meetings.  While 
the Fed’s Freedom of Information Office offers a $6 CD recording 
of the Fed’s “open meetings,” the informational content is 
minimal due to the many statutory exceptions contained in the 
inaptly named Government in the Sunshine Act.59 
The New York Federal Reserve Bank should provide 
Congress with a complete record of its backroom negotiations as 
well as full minutes of its board of directors’ meetings.  Two 
former chairmen of the House Banking committee—Henry Reuss 
(1975–80) and Henry B. Gonzalez (1989–94, Ranking Member 
until 1999)—managed to obtain the minutes of the board of 
directors’ meetings at the twelve Fed Banks.60  They were 
deliberately vacuumed, as emphasized by one Fed Bank 
president who told his board of directors in 1976: 
I would think that if this involves a lot of work, which it will . . . that 
someone on Mr. Reuss’ Committee, a friendly individual should know 
what we’re being called upon to do.  Because I think this can be used 
against Reuss if we react intelligently and as I see it in the St. Louis 
case, it’s appalling how skimpy or meaningless our minutes are, I’m 
sure we did this with great wisdom knowing that a man named Reuss 
would ask for them.  The minutes are really terribly shallow.  Tell 
nothing.61 
 
 56 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).  Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 
2008.  Seven days later the New York Times reported this latter action was taken for two 
hold investment banks.  Andrew Ross Sorkin and Vikas Bajaj, Shift for Goldman and 
Morgan Marks the End of An Era, NYTIMES.COM, September 22, 2008. 
 57 Joe Nocera & Edmund L. Andrews, Struggling to Keep Up as the Crisis Raced On, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/23/ 
business/economy/23paulson.html?scp=1&sq=Struggling%20to%20keep%20up%20as%20t
he%20crisis%20raced%20on&st=Search. 
 58 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 59 Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C 552(b) (2006); see also FRB: FOIA 
Exceptions, http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/exemptions.cfm (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2009).  
 60 See AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 19, 159. 
 61 Id. at 19. 
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Despite this apparent deliberate destruction of the record, 
there was some valuable information such as the discovery of the 
Fed’s role in the Watergate scandal cover-up.62  Reuss’s 
investigation led to the 1977 Federal Reserve Reform Act that 
brought Fed bank directors under the scope of federal conflict-of-
interest laws.63  Now the Board of Governors and the New York 
Fed Bank should present the congressional oversight 
committees—the Senate and House Banking and Financial 
Services Committees—with the complete records of the 
negotiations and their meetings with their new multi-trillion 
dollar loan policies. 
I wish to close with an example of poor policy being used by 
the Fed to discourage banks to lend. 
Bank reserves supplied by the Fed have risen from $44 
billion in September 2008 to an astounding $901 billion in 
January 2009.64  Consider what the Fed initiated in October 2008 
as the financial crisis deepened: It began to pay interest on these 
reserves.65  It said this policy helped it control reserves.66  That 
questionable rationale now means the Fed is paying banks to 
hold record reserves rather than lending money; a policy that 
intensifies the crisis. 
I testified before a Financial Services Subcommittee in 2003 
against the payment of interest on reserves because that policy 
would lead to a number of problems including parallel actions 
and asymmetrical information as has existed in the commercial 
bank lending markets where competition has been impeded.67  
 
 62 Id. at 20–28 (discussing how Fed Chairman Burns “doesn’t want the system to get 
involved” in the Watergate affair even though the Fed was the source of some of the 
money used to pay the Watergate burglars). 
 63 Id. at 19. 
 64 Jim McTague, Where’s the Stimulus?, Barron’s at 27, Feb. 2, 2009, 
http://online.barrons.com/articles/SBI123335947137335199.html. 
 65 See infra Figure 1; see also  Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, 2008 Monetary Policy Releases (Oct. 6, 2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081006a.htm. 
 66 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Monetary Policy Report to 
the Congress, July 15, 2008, at 30: 
The authority to pay interest on reserves could be helpful to the Federal 
Reserve in limiting the volatility in the federal funds rate.  The ability to pay 
interest on reserves would also allow the Federal Reserve to manage its 
balance sheet more efficiently in circumstances in which promoting financial 
stability required the provision of substantial amounts of discount window 
credit to the financial sector.  In light of these considerations, the Federal 
Reserve has asked the Congress to accelerate the effective date of statutory 
authority to pay interest on reserve balances, which is currently October 2011. 
 67 Business Checking Freedom Act of 2003: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on 
Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Committee on Financial Services, 
108th Cong. 28(1st Sess. 2003) (testimony of Robert Auerbach). 
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Without adequate competition, the interest payments on reserves 
would, in large part, pass through to bank stock holders not the 
deposit holders, as some academics have theorized.68  There was 
little doubt that the banks had successfully lobbied so that both 
sides of the aisle would favor paying interest on the reserves.  I 
estimated, at the time, the present value of the future stream of 
interest payments would be $16.7 billion.69 
I worked on legislation that was passed in 1980 that gave 
the Fed the right to pay interest on deposits in special cases in 
which they had to raise reserve requirements to control the 
money supply.70  I discussed these “supplemental reserve 
requirements,” worked out with former Fed Chairman Paul 
Volcker, when I testified in 2003.71  No one was interested, not 
even the Fed, when they testified about the need for paying 
interest on deposits. 
The effect of paying interest on reserves held at the Fed—
now at the rate of ¼ of 1 percent—is to reduce the banks’ 
incentive to lend.72  As the Fed’s target interest rate is raised—
which it must do in the future to prevent substantial inflation or 
a rise in interest rates from financing of dollars of federal 
government deficit—the interest on reserves will likewise be 
raised.73  If the spread between the risk-free rates of return on 
alternative income-earning assets increases, there will be a 
greater incentive for banks to hold reserves and decrease 
lending.74  Lending has taken a hit, as shown in Figure 2, for 
percentage changes in commercial loans from banks.75  The 
correct policy at this time should not be to penalize bank lending 
with a risk-free rate of return from the Fed to reward banks for 
holding the huge amount of reserves the Fed has supplied. 
 
 68 Id. at 29. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 36–37. 
 72 See id. at 33–34. 
 73 Federal Funds - Fedpoints, Federal Reserve Bank of New York,  
http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoints.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2009). 
 74 Business Checking Freedom Act of 2003-H.R. 758 and H.R. 859 Before the 
Subcomm. On Financial Inst. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial 
Services, 108th Congress 6 (2003) (statement of Donald Kohn, Governor, Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors). 
 75 See infra Figure 2, available at http://www.economagic.com/em-
cgi/charter.exe/fedstl/busloans+1990+2009+2+0+0+290+545++0 (last visited Apr. 4, 2009).  
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Figure 1: H.3 Aggregate Reserves of Depository Institutions 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Commercial and Industrial Loans at All Commercial 
Banks, Percentage monthly changes at annual rates 
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Figure 3: Federal Reserve Board of Governors: Press Release76 
Release Date: October 6, 2008 
Interest on Reserves 
The Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 originally 
authorized the Federal Reserve to begin paying interest on balances 
held by or on behalf of depository institutions beginning October 1, 
2011.  The recently enacted Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008 accelerated the effective date to October 1, 2008. 
Employing the accelerated authority, the Board has approved a rule to 
amend its Regulation D (Reserve Requirements of Depository 
Institutions) to direct the Federal Reserve Banks to pay interest on 
required reserve balances (that is, balances held to satisfy depository 
institutions’ reserve requirements) and on excess balances (balances 
held in excess of required reserve balances and clearing balances). 
The interest rate paid on required reserve balances will be the 
average targeted federal funds rate established by the Federal Open 
Market Committee over each reserve maintenance period less 10 basis 
points.  Paying interest on required reserve balances should 
essentially eliminate the opportunity cost of holding required 
reserves, promoting efficiency in the banking sector. 
The rate paid on excess balances will be set initially as the lowest 
targeted federal funds rate for each reserve maintenance period less 
75 basis points.  Paying interest on excess balances should help to 
establish a lower bound on the federal funds rate.  The formula for the 
interest rate on excess balances may be adjusted subsequently in light 
of experience and evolving market conditions.  The payment of 
interest on excess reserves will permit the Federal Reserve to expand 
its balance sheet as necessary to provide the liquidity necessary to 
support financial stability while implementing the monetary policy 
that is appropriate in light of the System’s macroeconomic objectives 
of maximum employment and price stability. 
 
 
 76 A full copy of this press release can be found at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081006a.htm.  See also 
Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions, 70 C.F.R. 59482, 59482–83 (Oct. 9, 
2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 204). 
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ADDENDUM 
Jim McTague, the Washington editor of Barron’s, 
highlighted a part of the author’s speech at the January 30, 2009 
Chapman University School of Law symposium: 
University of Texas Professor Robert Auerbach, an economist who 
studied under the late Milton Friedman, thinks he has the makings of 
a malpractice suit against Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, 
as the Fed is holding a record number of reserves: $901 billion in 
January as opposed to $44 billion in September [beginning in 
October], when the Fed began paying interest on money commercial 
banks parked at the central bank.  The banks prefer the sure rate of 
return they get by sitting in cash, not making loans.  Fed, stop paying, 
he says.77 
Two weeks later, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke 
told the National Press Club audience: 
Importantly, the management of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet 
and the conduct of monetary policy in the future will be made easier 
by the recent congressional action to give the Fed the authority to pay 
interest on bank reserves.  Because banks should be unwilling to lend 
reserves at a rate lower than they can receive from the Fed, the 
interest rate the Fed pays on bank reserves should help to set a floor 
on the overnight interest rate.78 
That was an admission that the Fed’s payment of interest on 
reserves did impair bank lending, a counterproductive policy in 
the 2008–09 financial crisis.  Also, William T. Gavin, a Federal 
Reserve economist, wrote “[f]irst, for the individual bank, the 
risk-free rate of ¼ percent must be the bank’s perception of its 
best investment opportunity.”79  
Also, Bernanke’s rationale for preventing banks from lending 
at lower interest rates was illogical at the time when the Fed’s 
target interest rate for federal funds was zero to a quarter of one 
percent.  The banks would be unlikely to lend at negative rates of 
interest even without the Fed paying them to hold reserves. 
 
 77 Jim McTague, Where’s the Stimulus?, BARRON’S, at 27, Feb. 2, 2009, 
http://online.barrons.com/articles/SBI123335947137335199.html. 
 78 Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, Speech at 
the National Press Club Luncheon (Feb. 18, 2009), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090218a.htm. 
 79 William T. Gavin, More Money; Understanding Recent Changes in the Monetary 
Base, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 57 (Mar./Apr. 2009), available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/09/03/Gavin.pdf. 
